Sa, 23\/01\/2018 – 10:41 Hejar\u00ea \u015eamil<\/p>\n
H\u0130\u00c7B\u0130R K\u00dcRD, H\u0130\u00c7B\u0130R K\u00dcRD \u00d6RG\u00dcT\u00dc BU AYIN SONUNDA SO\u00c7\u0130’DE RUSYA’NIN \u00d6NC\u00dcLL\u00dc\u011e\u00dcNDE YAPILMASI P\u0130LANLANAN TOPLANTIYA KATILMAMALIDIR. KATILANI TAR\u0130H LANETLER! <\/p>\n
**<\/p>\n
Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nun izin vermesi sonucunda tc devleti 20 Ocak 2018 tarihinde, eski Suriye devletinin Kuzey Suriye Federasyonu\u2019nda bulunan Afrin b\u00f6lgesine i\u015fgal sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131 ba\u015flatt\u0131.<\/p>\n
Bu sald\u0131r\u0131dan bir g\u00fcn \u00f6nce Putin Rusyas\u0131, Kuzey Suriye Federasyonu\u2019nun K\u00fcrd yetkililerine kimi K\u00fcrd b\u00f6lgelerin Esat diktat\u00f6rl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcne teslim edilmesi \u015fart\u0131yla T\u00fcrkiye devletinin sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131 engelleyebilecekleri \u015fart\u0131n\u0131 ko\u015fmu\u015f, K\u00fcrdler Rusya\u2019n\u0131n bu talebini reddetmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n
Bu talebin reddedilmesinden sonra \u0131rk\u00e7\u0131 t\u00fcrk devleti, Efrin b\u00f6lgesine havadan sava\u015f u\u00e7aklar\u0131 ile, karadan silahland\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131 ter\u00f6rist \u00d6SO gruplar\u0131 ile amans\u0131z bir sald\u0131r\u0131 ba\u015flatm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n
Kimi K\u00fcrd kesimler, bu durumu \u2018Rus ihaneti\u2019, \u2018Rus kalle\u015fli\u011fi\u2019 olarak de\u011ferlendirmektedir.<\/p>\n
Bizler de bir K\u00fcrd olarak Efrin i\u015fgal giri\u015fimi nedeniyle sosyal medyada Rusya\u2019ya kar\u015f\u0131 duygusal tepkilerimizi en sert bi\u00e7imde ortaya koyduk.<\/p>\n
Ancak mesele daha k\u00f6kl\u00fcd\u00fcr. Meselenin nas\u0131l bir k\u00f6keni oldu\u011funu anlamak i\u00e7in 12 Kas\u0131m 2016 tarihinde KP\u2019de yay\u0131nlanm\u0131\u015f \u201cRusya\u2019n\u0131n Ortado\u011fu ve K\u00fcrdistan siyaseti\u201d ba\u015fl\u0131kl\u0131 analiz yaz\u0131m\u0131z\u0131 tekrardan yay\u0131nlamakta fayda g\u00f6rd\u00fck.<\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Ortado\u011fu ve Kurdistan siyasetini anlamak a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan \u2018masa\u00fcst\u00fc\u2019 bir yaz\u0131.<\/p>\n
\u0130yi okumalar\u2026 <\/p>\n
***<\/p>\n
RUSYA’NIN ORTADO\u011eU VE K\u00dcRD\u0130STAN S\u0130YASET\u0130<\/p>\n
2016-11-12<\/p>\n
K\u00fcrdler\u2019in Rusya\u2019n\u0131n I\u015e\u0130D\u2019le m\u00fccadele stratejisinde yerini objektif bi\u00e7imde tahlil edebilmek i\u00e7in Rusya\u2019n\u0131n \u00f6zelde I\u015e\u0130D, genelde Orta ve Yak\u0131n Do\u011fu siyasetine ve bu ba\u011flamda i\u00e7 ve d\u0131\u015f siyaset \u00f6nceliklerine g\u00f6z atmak do\u011fru olacakt\u0131r. \u00c7a\u011fda\u015f Rusya\u2019n\u0131n, Eski Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nden farkl\u0131 olarak devletlere ve toplumlara ideolojik babal\u0131k yapma yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7oktan terk etti\u011fi, kendini basmakal\u0131p stratejik doktrinlere esir etmedi\u011fi, \u00f6zellikle d\u0131\u015f siyasette ekonomik gideri, gelirinden fazla olan mecralara merakl\u0131 olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131, ataca\u011f\u0131 ad\u0131mlar\u0131 pragmatik parametreler eksenine oturtmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 ba\u015fta vurgulanmas\u0131 gereken \u00f6nemli bir husustur.<\/p>\n
RUSYA\u2019NIN DI\u015e VE \u0130\u00c7 S\u0130YASETTEK\u0130 \u00d6NCEL\u0130KLER\u0130<\/p>\n
Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nun d\u0131\u015f siyaset ve ulusal g\u00fcvenlik \u00f6nceliklerinin do\u011fru tespiti, K\u00fcrdlerle ili\u015fkilerinin ne d\u00fczeye ula\u015fabilece\u011fini kestirebilmenin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra, I\u015e\u0130D\u2019le m\u00fccadelede Ruslar\u0131 ve K\u00fcrdleri nas\u0131l bir ili\u015fki ser\u00fcveninin bekledi\u011fini anlamam\u0131z\u0131 sa\u011flayacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n uluslararas\u0131 siyasetinin temel motivasyonu, \u00c7in ile uyum i\u00e7erisinde, Bat\u0131 ile \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmadan m\u00fcmk\u00fcn oldu\u011funca ka\u00e7\u0131narak, kom\u015fu devletlerle iyi ili\u015fkiler geli\u015ftirerek, etki alanlar\u0131n\u0131 geni\u015fletmek oldu\u011fudur. 17 Nisan 2014’te K\u0131r\u0131m\u2019\u0131n Rusya\u2019ya ba\u011flanmas\u0131ndan[i] sonra Bat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n ekonomik ambargolar\u0131na temkinli yakla\u015farak, \u00e7eli\u015fkileri derinle\u015ftirmemeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan Rusya iktidar\u0131, Bat\u0131 d\u00fcnyas\u0131 ile ili\u015fkilerini normalle\u015ftirmek i\u00e7in bir dizi sistematik ad\u0131mlar atma yolunu se\u00e7ti. Putin\u2019in Suriye\u2019ye ABD ile uyumlu ve anla\u015fmal\u0131 askeri m\u00fcdahalesindeki temel bir ama\u00e7 da hi\u00e7 ku\u015fkusuz, ortak bir d\u00fc\u015fmana kar\u015f\u0131 ayn\u0131 mevzide m\u00fccadele ederek, Bat\u0131\u2019yla aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkileri normalle\u015ftirmeye y\u00f6nelikti. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Suriye m\u00fcdahalesinin, ABD ile ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131 Ukrayna eksenli gerginli\u011fin yumu\u015famas\u0131na m\u00fcspet etkisinin bulundu\u011fu derin analizler gerektirmemektedir. <\/p>\n
Vladimir Putin\u2019in iktidara geldi\u011fi 2000 y\u0131l\u0131ndan sonra Sovyetler\u2019in \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcn a\u011f\u0131r siyasi, ekonomik enkaz\u0131 alt\u0131nda bocalayan Rusya\u2019n\u0131n, uluslararas\u0131 siyasette, stratejik savunma a\u015famas\u0131ndan h\u0131zla stratejik denge a\u015famas\u0131na ge\u00e7i\u015fmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fcl\u00fcyor. Ekonomik kalk\u0131nma, halk\u0131n sosyal refah d\u00fczeyinin iyile\u015ftirilmesi, uluslararas\u0131 alanda itibar\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fc\u00e7lendirilmesi, \u201culuslararas\u0131 g\u00fcvenlik ve stratejik istikrara zarar vermeksizin\u201d n\u00fckleer silahlanmaya ayr\u0131lan b\u00fct\u00e7enin azalt\u0131lmas\u0131 esas al\u0131nd\u0131.<\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n 2016 y\u0131l\u0131nda yay\u0131nlanm\u0131\u015f, 2020\u2019ye kadarki \u00f6nceliklerinin belirlendi\u011fi Ulusal G\u00fcvenlik Stratejisi Belgesi\u2019nde[ii] ulusal g\u00fcvenli\u011fe en belli ba\u015fl\u0131 tehditler olarak renkli devrimler, dinci ve milliyet\u00e7i ideolojileri kullanan radikal gruplara kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadele, b\u00f6lgede NATO\u2019nun Rusya s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131na kadar yakla\u015fmas\u0131, kimyasal silah tehlikesi, Ukrayna krizi \u00fczerinden d\u00fcnyada \u2018D\u00fc\u015fman Rusya\u2019 imaj\u0131n\u0131n yarat\u0131lmas\u0131, enformasyon sava\u015f\u0131m\u0131 ve yolsuzluk vurgusu yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. <\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n genel stratejik \u00f6nceliklerinin ba\u015f\u0131nda, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n ulusal \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131n, Bat\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan kabul edilmesi, \u2018stratejik e\u015fitlik\u2019e uyulmas\u0131, Bat\u0131 d\u00fcnyas\u0131 ile askeri, siyasi ve ekonomik alanda dengenin korunmas\u0131n\u0131n oldu\u011fu devlet yetkilileri taraf\u0131ndan s\u0131k\u00e7a dile getirilmektedir[iii]. Askeri g\u00fcce \u2018di\u011fer yollar etkisiz kald\u0131\u011f\u0131\u2019 takdirde ba\u015fvurulaca\u011f\u0131 \u00f6zenle vurgulanmaktad\u0131r[iv]. <\/p>\n
Rusya, Bat\u0131 ile aras\u0131nda stratejik dengeyi, \u00c7in ve Hindistan gibi Asya devleri ile ekonomik ve siyasi ili\u015fkiler kurarak sa\u011flamaktad\u0131r. Etki alan\u0131n\u0131; s\u0131n\u0131rda\u015f devletler, eski SSCB Cumhuriyetleri ile birlikte ekonomik ve askeri savunma birlikleri kurarak, geni\u015fletmeyi hedeflemektedir[v]. 01 Ocak 2015\u2019te Beyaz Rusya, Kazakistan, K\u0131rg\u0131zistan ve Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n kat\u0131l\u0131m\u0131yla kurulan Avrasya Ekonomik Birli\u011fi\u2019yle Vietnam, M\u0131s\u0131r, Tayland, \u0130ran gibi devletler aras\u0131nda g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ayr\u0131ca, Singapur, Pakistan, \u0130srail, Hindistan, \u00c7in ve Tunus \u2019in bu birli\u011fe ilgi g\u00f6sterdi\u011fi de bilinmektedir [vi]. <\/p>\n
Somut olarak Orta ve Yak\u0131n Do\u011fu\u2019da Rusya, geleneksel olarak iyi ili\u015fkileri bulunan \u0130ran, Suriye, Irak, L\u00fcbnan gibi devletleri basamak yaparak, yeniden dizayn edilen b\u00f6lgede s\u00f6z sahibi olmaya, g\u00fc\u00e7 bo\u015fluklar\u0131n\u0131 doldurmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmakta, etki alan\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flamla\u015ft\u0131rmak, m\u00fcmk\u00fcn oranda yay\u0131lma stratejisi g\u00fctmektedir. <\/p>\n
Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nun, \u0131srarla b\u00f6lgede mevcut siyasi stat\u00fckonun korunmas\u0131, var olan s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n dokunulmazl\u0131\u011f\u0131 prensipleri ile hareket ederken, bir taraftan da b\u00f6lgedeki \u015eii mezhepli gerici rejimlerin hamisi g\u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcs\u00fc vermekten rahats\u0131zl\u0131k hissetmedi\u011fi g\u00f6zlenebiliyor. Rusya, ba\u015fta \u0130ran olmak \u00fczere b\u00f6lgedeki ABD\u2019ye has\u0131ml\u0131k besleyen \u015eii rejimler \u00fczerinden, b\u00f6lgede daha kolay oyun kurabilece\u011fine inanmaktad\u0131r. \u00d6zellikle Suriye meselesini pazarl\u0131k konusu yapan Rusya, bu krizin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcnde aktif yer alarak ayn\u0131 zamanda d\u00fcnyan\u0131n di\u011fer b\u00f6lgelerindeki ekonomik, siyasi ve jeopolitik konumunu g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmeyi esas alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Suriye\u2019deki Rus askeri m\u00fcdahalesini ve y\u00fcr\u00fctt\u00fc\u011f\u00fc diplomatik \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131, sadece Orta Do\u011fu\u2019da de\u011fil, d\u00fcnyada kendi n\u00fcfuz ve etki alanlar\u0131n\u0131 korumaya y\u00f6nelik, bir savunma hamlesi olarak da alg\u0131lamak yanl\u0131\u015f olmayacakt\u0131r[vii]. <\/p>\n
ORTA VE YAKIN DO\u011eU POL\u0130T\u0130KASINDA, D\u00d6RT PAR\u00c7A K\u00dcRD\u0130STAN\u2019A D\u00d6N\u00dcK YAKLA\u015eIMIN TEMEL PARAMETRELER\u0130<\/p>\n
Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nun Sovyetler\u2019in \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnden sonraki d\u0131\u015f siyaseti, d\u00fcnyada ve Ortado\u011fu\u2019da stat\u00fckonun korunmas\u0131, renkli devrimlerden ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131lmas\u0131, yerle\u015fik gerici d\u00fczenlerin temelini sarsan \u2018Arap bahar\u0131\u2019 gibi stat\u00fcko s\u00f6k\u00fcc\u00fc kalk\u0131\u015fmalara izin verilmemesi prensipleri \u00fczerine kuruludur. M\u00fcsl\u00fcman Orta ve Yak\u0131n Do\u011fu\u2019da mevcut durumun devam etmesini Rusya, birka\u00e7 nedenden dolay\u0131 \u0131srarla savunmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n
\u00d6ncelikle b\u00f6lgede var olan dengelerin temellerini sarsan stratejilerin, Washington eksenli olmas\u0131na, ba\u015f oyun kurucular\u0131n Bat\u0131l\u0131 merkezlerde oturmas\u0131na Moskova\u2019n\u0131n muhalefet etmesi i\u00e7 siyaseti zorlayan de\u011fil kolayla\u015ft\u0131ran amillerdir. Geleneksel iyi ili\u015fkileri bulunan Suriye ve \u0130ran gibi devletlerin sallanmas\u0131 sonucu burada yeni olu\u015facak rejimlerin Bat\u0131 etkisine girmesini Rusya, ulusal g\u00fcvenli\u011fine kar\u015f\u0131 bir tehlike olarak g\u00f6rmekte, jeostratejik dengelerin bozulmas\u0131 olarak alg\u0131lamaktad\u0131r. Moskova\u2019da Bat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n kendi s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131na yakla\u015fmas\u0131, G\u00fcney\u2019den ablukaya al\u0131nma olarak de\u011ferlendirilmektedir. B\u00fct\u00fcn sava\u015flar\u0131n, b\u00f6lgesel, b\u00f6lgeler aras\u0131 gerginliklerin, devletler \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131n ekonomik arka plan\u0131 oldu\u011fu a\u00e7\u0131kt\u0131r. Rusya, temel oyun kurucular\u0131n; kontrol edilebilir sava\u015flarla b\u00f6lgeyi yeniden dizayn ederek petrol ve gaz ba\u015fta olmakla ekonomik kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131 daha fazla kendi lehlerine kullanma h\u0131rslar\u0131ndan rahats\u0131zl\u0131k duymakta, k\u00fcresel bir g\u00fc\u00e7 olarak b\u00f6lgeye askeri, siyasi ve diplomatik m\u00fcdahaleler yaparak, pastadan pay kapmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktad\u0131r. <\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n, son 200 y\u0131lda 28 kanl\u0131 sava\u015f ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve bir NATO devleti olarak \u2018burnunun dibine girmi\u015f T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye d\u00f6n\u00fck has\u0131mane yakla\u015f\u0131mlara sahip olmas\u0131n\u0131, TC\u2019yi \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015fe g\u00f6t\u00fcrebilecek en optimal g\u00fc\u00e7 olan K\u00fcrd \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fck ve ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k fikrini desteklemesi gerekti\u011fini, Rusya\u2019da da d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnenler az olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi bu konuda \u00e7ok\u00e7a analiz raporlar\u0131, kitaplar da yaz\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. <\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n d\u0131\u015f siyaset akl\u0131, NATO \u00fcyesi ve Bat\u0131 eksenli bir do\u011fu \u00fclkesi olan T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin \u2018bir b\u00f6lge devleti\u2019 olmaktan daha fazla g\u00fc\u00e7lenmesini istemese de, K\u00fcrdlerin \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc ve ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kabul edecek kadar da zay\u0131flamas\u0131n\u0131 benimsememi\u015ftir. Kars Antla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019ndan[viii] sonra, bu iki devlet aras\u0131nda olu\u015fan dengenin korunmas\u0131 yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131, esas al\u0131nm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya, Kuzey K\u00fcrdistan\u2019\u0131n \u00f6zg\u00fcrle\u015fmesine ittifak i\u00e7inde bulundu\u011fu \u0130ran, Irak ve Suriye i\u00e7in emsal te\u015fkil edece\u011fi anlay\u0131\u015f\u0131yla s\u0131cak yakla\u015fmam\u0131\u015f, K\u00fcrdlerle \u00f6zg\u00fcn bir ili\u015fki stratejisi olu\u015fturmam\u0131\u015f, K\u00fcrd ve K\u00fcrdistan meselesine, K\u00fcrdistan\u0131 i\u015fgal eden d\u00f6rt devletle y\u00fcr\u00fctt\u00fc\u011f\u00fc siyasetin bir uzant\u0131s\u0131 olarak yakla\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. K\u00fcrd \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fck m\u00fccadelesine d\u00f6n\u00fck destek mahiyetli a\u00e7\u0131klamalar\u0131 olmu\u015fsa da, K\u00fcrd fakt\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fc, b\u00f6lgede ve s\u00f6z konusu devletlerle y\u00fcr\u00fctt\u00fc\u011f\u00fc siyasette, bir kart olarak kullanmay\u0131 tercih etmi\u015ftir. <\/p>\n
Ortado\u011fu\u2019da stat\u00fckolar\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcl\u00fc\u015f a\u015famas\u0131na girmesi, 20 Mart 2003\u2019te ABD\u2019nin Irak\u2019a operasyonuyla ba\u015flam\u0131\u015f, Saddam\u2019\u0131n devrilmesine en \u015fiddetle kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kanlar\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131nda Rusya gelmi\u015ftir. Moskova hi\u00e7bir zaman G\u00fcney K\u00fcrdistan\u2019da federal bir sistem olu\u015fmas\u0131na s\u0131cak yakla\u015fmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. K\u00fcrdistan halk\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fck iradesi ve K\u00fcrdistan B\u00f6lge H\u00fck\u00fcmeti\u2019nin siyasi ve iktisadi ba\u015far\u0131lar\u0131, do\u011fru m\u00fcttefikler politikas\u0131yla hesapla\u015fmak zorunda kalan Rusya, salt kendi ekonomik, siyasi ve jeopolitik \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 nedeniyle, G\u00fcney K\u00fcrdistan\u2019la ekonomik ve siyasi ili\u015fkiler kurmak zorunda kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. <\/p>\n
Kurulu\u015funda belirleyici rol oynad\u0131\u011f\u0131 Mahabad Kurdistan Cumhuriyeti\u2019ni (1946-1947) Bat\u0131\u2019l\u0131 ve b\u00f6lge devletleri ile anla\u015fmalara kurban eden Sovyet Rusya, \u0130ran\u2019da binlerce K\u00fcrd\u2019\u00fcn \u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcne sebep olmu\u015f 1979 molla devrimine, \u015eii \u015feriat\u00e7\u0131lar\u0131n Rusya\u2019y\u0131 \u2018k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u015feytan\u2019 adland\u0131rmas\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131n olumsuz bir tepki vermemi\u015ftir[ix]. 1986\u2019da Rusya ile \u0130ran aras\u0131nda imzalanan ekonomik protokolden[x] sonra iki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda ili\u015fkiler geli\u015fme trendi g\u00f6stermi\u015ftir [xi]\n
Ekim 2015\u2019te Ba\u011fdat\u2019ta Moskova ve Tahran\u2019\u0131n i\u015ftiraki ile olu\u015fturulan \u2018ter\u00f6rizme kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadele koordinasyonu\u2019, A\u011fustos 2016\u2019da Hemedan Havaalan\u0131\u2019ndan Suriye\u2019deki mevzilerin vurulmas\u0131 ile pratik bir a\u015famaya varm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n
Rusya, \u0130ran\u2019da ba\u015fta K\u00fcrdler olmak \u00fczere di\u011fer etnik gruplara uygulanan vah\u015fet siyasetine sessiz kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n
2011\u2019de ba\u015flayan Suriye krizinde Rusya\u2019n\u0131n ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 pozisyon, stat\u00fckonun korunmas\u0131 eksenli olup, Sovyetlerden kalma iyi ili\u015fkiler i\u00e7inde bulundu\u011fu Esad rejiminin y\u0131k\u0131larak, \u00fclkenin radikal bi\u00e7imde dizayn edilmesine kar\u015f\u0131 gelmek olmu\u015ftur. Esad rejiminin yard\u0131m \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131s\u0131 \u00fczerine, Suriye\u2019ye m\u00fcdahalede bulunan Rusya, bu minvalle b\u00f6lgede a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 artt\u0131rmay\u0131, krizde s\u00f6z sahibi olmay\u0131, Tarsus\u2019taki deniz \u00fcss\u00fcn\u00fc g\u00fcvenceye almay\u0131 hedeflemi\u015ftir. Ukrayna krizi nedeniyle, ciddi sorunlar ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131 Bat\u0131\u2019yla I\u015e\u0130D ter\u00f6r\u00fcne kar\u015f\u0131 i\u015fbirli\u011fi yaparak, gerginli\u011fi minimize etmi\u015f, Bat\u0131\u2019yla balans\u0131 bu b\u00f6lgede de korumay\u0131 esas alan \u00e7ok y\u00f6nl\u00fc bir siyaset g\u00fctm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. <\/p>\n
Suriye krizinin ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00fcnden bu yana her f\u0131rsatta Suriye Devleti\u2019nin toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc savundu\u011funu dile getiren [xii], Moskova\u2019n\u0131n, K\u00fcrdler\u2019in Bat\u0131 K\u00fcrdistan\u2019da siyasi bir stat\u00fcye kavu\u015fmas\u0131na merakl\u0131 olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ku\u015fku uyand\u0131racak bir husus da de\u011fildir. Rusya, Suriye\u2019nin \u2018toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fc\u2019 kayg\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 bir\u00e7ok defa D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 Sergey Lavrov\u2019un diliyle, 27 A\u011fustos\u2019ta Cenevre\u2019de ABD\u2019li meslekta\u015f\u0131 John Kerry ile g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmesinde bir kez daha \u015f\u00f6yle dile getirmi\u015ftir: \u201cK\u00fcrdler Suriye Devleti\u2019nin bir par\u00e7as\u0131, sorunun \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fcn bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olarak kalmal\u0131d\u0131rlar. Suriye\u2019yi b\u00f6lmek i\u00e7in kullan\u0131lmamal\u0131d\u0131r, \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc b\u00f6l\u00fcnme b\u00f6lgede zincirleme reaksiyon do\u011furabilir.[xiii]\u201d<\/p>\n
RUSYA\u2019YI I\u015e\u0130D\u2019E KAR\u015eI AKT\u0130F M\u00dcCADELEYE VE SUR\u0130YE\u2019YE ASKER\u0130 M\u00dcDAHALE YAPMAYA \u0130TEN NEDENLER<\/p>\n
Rusya ve \u00e7evre devlet vatanda\u015flar\u0131n\u0131n Irak, Suriye, G\u00fcney ve Bat\u0131 K\u00fcrdistan\u2019da sava\u015fan \u0130slami ter\u00f6r \u00f6rg\u00fctlerine kat\u0131l\u0131m\u0131, ulusal g\u00fcvenli\u011fe tehdit alg\u0131s\u0131 kapsam\u0131nda ele al\u0131nmaktad\u0131r. I\u015e\u0130D, El-Nusra gibi ter\u00f6r \u00f6rg\u00fctlerinin mevzi kaybederek, zay\u0131flama a\u015famas\u0131na girmesi, ter\u00f6r \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fc saflar\u0131nda yer alan yabanc\u0131 vatanda\u015flar\u0131n kendi \u00fclkelerine d\u00f6nme \u00e7abalar\u0131n\u0131 da art\u0131rmaktad\u0131r. Ayr\u0131ca ter\u00f6r \u00f6rg\u00fctleri, yabanc\u0131 uyruklu ter\u00f6ristleri ter\u00f6r eylemleri yapmak i\u00e7in kendi \u00fclkelerine g\u00f6ndermektedirler. B\u00f6ylesi bir durum, ter\u00f6r \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fc saflar\u0131nda vatanda\u015flar\u0131 bulunan devletlerin g\u00fcvenlik g\u00fc\u00e7lerini harekete ge\u00e7irmi\u015ftir. <\/p>\n
Rusya Federasyonu arazisinde ya\u015fayan 20 milyon Sunni m\u00fcsl\u00fcman ahali, genel n\u00fcfusun ortalama % 7\u2019sini olu\u015fturmaktad\u0131r. Rusya ile aras\u0131nda vizesiz gidi\u015f geli\u015f anla\u015fmas\u0131 bulunan Azerbaycan, Kazakistan, Beyaz Rusya, \u00d6zbekistan, K\u0131rg\u0131zistan ve Tacikistan\u2019da 49 milyon 500 bin m\u00fcsl\u00fcman ya\u015famaktad\u0131r. Rusya\u2019ya vizesiz giri\u015f yap\u0131labilen Avrasya G\u00fcmr\u00fck Birli\u011fi\u2019ne s\u0131n\u0131rda\u015f T\u00fcrkmenistan, G\u00fcrcistan, \u0130ran, T\u00fcrkiye, Afganistan gibi \u00fclkelerde ise 196 milyon 500 bin m\u00fcsl\u00fcman ahali bulunmaktad\u0131r [xiv]. <\/p>\n
Suriye ve Irak\u2019ta ter\u00f6rist faaliyet y\u00fcr\u00fcten Rus vatanda\u015flar\u0131n\u0131n say\u0131s\u0131, korkutucu rakamlara ula\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya \u0130\u00e7i\u015fleri Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 yetkilisi Eduard Ribintsev, 25 Ekim 2015\u2019te yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamada \u201csadece Suriye\u2019de I\u015e\u0130D saflar\u0131nda binlerce Rus vatanda\u015f\u0131n\u0131n bulundu\u011funu biliyoruz ve onlar hakk\u0131nda 447 dava a\u00e7\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r\u201d[xv] ifadesini kullanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Aral\u0131k\u2019ta bu rakam 889\u2019a ula\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r[xvi]. Rusya istihbarat \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fc (FSB) ba\u015fkan yard\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131 Evgeniy Sisoyev, 10 Ekim 2015\u2019te verdi\u011fi deme\u00e7te, I\u015e\u0130D saflar\u0131nda 7000 Rus ve BDT vatanda\u015f\u0131 bulundu\u011funu dile getirmi\u015ftir.[xvii]. Rusya ve di\u011fer \u00fclkelerin istihbarat verilerine ve stratejik ara\u015ft\u0131rma merkezlerinin ula\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 sonu\u00e7lara g\u00f6re, Rusya\u2019ya ba\u011fl\u0131 Da\u011f\u0131stan \u00d6zerk Cumhuriyeti\u2019nden 1000, \u00c7e\u00e7enistan \u00d6zerk Cumhuriyeti\u2019nden ise 1700 ki\u015fi, I\u015e\u0130D saflar\u0131nda sava\u015fmak i\u00e7in genellikle T\u00fcrkiye \u00fczerinden Suriye\u2019ye giri\u015f yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r[xviii].<\/p>\n
Rusya i\u00e7 istihbarat \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fc (FSB) ba\u015fkan\u0131 Aleksand\u0131r Bortnikov 25 Haziran 2016\u2019ta yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamada Ortado\u011fu\u2019da \u0130slami \u00f6rg\u00fct saflar\u0131nda e\u011fitim g\u00f6rerek, Rusya\u2019da intihar eylemi yapmak i\u00e7in g\u00f6nderilmi\u015f 220 ter\u00f6ristin ele ge\u00e7irildi\u011fi bilgisini vermi\u015ftir[xix]. <\/p>\n
Rus bas\u0131n\u0131nda Ortado\u011fu\u2019da I\u015e\u0130D\u2019e kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadelede 500\u2019den fazla Rusya vatanda\u015f\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fc, bir o kadar Rusya k\u00f6kenli ter\u00f6ristin de Rusya\u2019ya d\u00f6nme haz\u0131rl\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7erisinde oldu\u011fu bilgileri yer alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu durum, do\u011fal olarak Rus g\u00fcvenlik g\u00fc\u00e7lerini harekete ge\u00e7irmi\u015f, siyasi \u00e7evrelerde derin endi\u015feler yaratm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya\u2019ya vizesiz giri\u015f yapabilen Azerbaycan, \u00d6zbekistan, K\u0131rg\u0131zistan, Tacikistan uyruklu ter\u00f6ristlerin de Rusya kentlerinde ter\u00f6rist eylemler yapma ihtimali g\u00f6z ard\u0131 edilmemektedir.<\/p>\n
De\u011fi\u015fik verilere g\u00f6re, I\u015e\u0130D saflar\u0131nda, Orta Asya devletlerinden 3500-5000 ki\u015fi bulunmaktad\u0131r. Bunlar aras\u0131nda \u00d6zbekler ilk s\u0131rada yer al\u0131yor. \u00d6zbekistan ile ilgili ara\u015ft\u0131rma yapan uzman kurulu\u015flar sadece 2500 \u00d6zbekistan vatanda\u015f\u0131n\u0131n, \u0130slami ter\u00f6ristlerin saflar\u0131nda olabilece\u011fini tahmin etmektedirler. K\u0131rg\u0131zistan\u2019\u0131n g\u00fcvenlik g\u00fc\u00e7leri bu \u00fclkeden I\u015e\u0130D\u2019e 2000\u2019 yak\u0131n kat\u0131l\u0131m\u0131n oldu\u011funu, ter\u00f6r \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fc g\u00fc\u00e7 kaybettik\u00e7e, vatanda\u015flar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7e\u015fitli yollarla geriye d\u00f6nmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kaydetmektedirler[xx].<\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n I\u015e\u0130D ve El-Nusra gibi \u0130slami ter\u00f6rist \u00f6rg\u00fctlere kar\u015f\u0131 sahada m\u00fccadele y\u00fcr\u00fctmesinin ciddi nedenlerinden biri ter\u00f6r oca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 bulundu\u011fu yerde s\u00f6nd\u00fcrerek, vatanda\u015flar\u0131n\u0131n geri d\u00f6nmesini engellemek, yerinde etkisiz hale getirmek ve kontrol alt\u0131na almakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n
Rusya Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Vladimir Putin, 03.12.2015 tarihli millete sesleni\u015finde, Rusya ve BDT \u00fclkelerinden \u0130slami ter\u00f6r \u00f6rg\u00fctlerine kat\u0131lanlar i\u00e7in, onlar\u0131 \u201cuzak y\u00f6relerde kar\u015f\u0131lamak ve ortadan kald\u0131rmak zorunday\u0131z\u201d[xxi] ifadesini kullanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n
K\u00fcresel bir g\u00fc\u00e7 olan Rusya\u2019y\u0131, Suriye\u2019de I\u015e\u0130D ter\u00f6r\u00fcne kar\u015f\u0131 askeri m\u00fcdahaleye iten sebeplerden biri de hi\u00e7 ku\u015fkusuz yeniden \u015fekillenen Ortado\u011fu m\u00fcstevisinde yeniden etkin bir akt\u00f6r olma arzusudur. Sovyetler\u2019in \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnden sonra b\u00f6lgede kaybetti\u011fi stratejik konumunu g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmeyi istedi\u011fi konusunda yayg\u0131n g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fler, derinlikli analizler mevcuttur. Rus yetkililerin davran\u0131\u015flar\u0131, bu analizleri destekler niteliktedir. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Ortado\u011fu\u2019daki So\u011fuk Sava\u015f d\u00f6neminden kalma birincil m\u00fcttefiki olan Suriye rejiminin d\u00fc\u015fmesi, Moskova\u2019da b\u00f6lgedeki etkinli\u011fin devaml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131na, \u00f6l\u00fcmc\u00fcl bir darbe olarak de\u011ferlendirilmektedir[xxii]. <\/p>\n
Rusya, Suriye krizine yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n\u0131, 2011\u2019lerden itibaren \u015fu \u00fc\u00e7 prensip \u00fczerinde kurmu\u015ftu: Rejim normal olmayan yollarla de\u011fi\u015ftirilmemelidir; yabanc\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7ler Suriye iktidar\u0131n\u0131n iradesine ra\u011fmen, bu \u00fclkede askeri operasyonlar ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmemeli ve muhalefeti silahland\u0131rmamal\u0131d\u0131r; \u00fclkeye ambargo uygulanmamal\u0131d\u0131r. B\u00f6lgedeki geli\u015fmelerin seyrine g\u00f6re, Moskova temel yakla\u015f\u0131mlar\u0131nda tashih yapmasa da, \u2018Suriye devletinin daveti ile\u2019 rejimi korumak i\u00e7in \u00fclkede y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclen askeri operasyonlara kat\u0131lmay\u0131 tercih etti. Suriye rejiminin d\u00fc\u015fmesi halinde s\u0131ran\u0131n \u0130ran\u2019a, hatta T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye, oradan Asya devletlerine kadar s\u0131\u00e7ramas\u0131 olas\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131, \u2018renkli devrimler\u2019den rahats\u0131zl\u0131k duyan Rusya\u2019n\u0131n, istikrarl\u0131 bi\u00e7imde \u00e7evre devletlerde n\u00fcfusunu ve etkisini g\u00fc\u00e7lendirme stratejisine ters d\u00fc\u015fmekteydi.<\/p>\n
Ayr\u0131ca Rusya\u2019ya uyumlu bir Suriye devleti ve rejimi, global askeri strateji a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan da Moskova i\u00e7in hava ve su kadar gerekliydi. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n \u00fclke d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda yaln\u0131z Vietnam\u2019da ve Suriye\u2019de iki deniz \u00fcss\u00fc bulundu\u011fu dikkate al\u0131n\u0131rsa, Tarsus\u2019taki deniz \u00fcss\u00fcn\u00fcn \u00f6nemi daha da anla\u015f\u0131lm\u0131\u015f olur. Tarsus deniz \u00fcss\u00fc ve Suriye Hmeymim\u2019deki hava \u00fcss\u00fc olmadan Akdeniz havzas\u0131nda ve genelde Ortado\u011fu\u2019da Rusya\u2019n\u0131n s\u00f6z sahibi bir g\u00fc\u00e7 olmas\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fclemez.<\/p>\n
I\u015e\u0130D\u2019e kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadele kapsam\u0131nda, Suriye rejiminin d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fclmemesi i\u00e7in kollar\u0131n\u0131 s\u0131vayan Rusya y\u00f6netimi, krizi f\u0131rsata d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcrme \u00e7abas\u0131yla, d\u00f6rt y\u00f6nl\u00fc bir strateji izledi: (1) Uluslararas\u0131 I\u015e\u0130D ter\u00f6r \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fcn\u00fc, kendi ulusal g\u00fcvenli\u011fi ve d\u00fcnya g\u00fcvenli\u011fi a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan tehlike olmaktan \u00e7\u0131karmak; (2) Suriye rejimini askeri, siyasi ve diplomatik a\u00e7\u0131dan desteklemek suretiyle, ani \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015ften kurtararak, bu \u00fclkedeki \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 garantiye almak; (3) Uluslararas\u0131 ter\u00f6rizme kar\u015f\u0131 ortak m\u00fccadele kapsam\u0131nda, Ukrayna krizi nedeniyle kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya geldi\u011fi Bat\u0131 d\u00fcnyas\u0131 ile ili\u015fkilerini d\u00fczelterek; \u2018D\u00fc\u015fman Rusya\u2019 alg\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 de\u011fi\u015ftirerek, \u00fclkesini hedef olmaktan \u00e7\u0131karmak; (4) k\u00fcresel g\u00fc\u00e7 oldu\u011funu, Rusya\u2019s\u0131z hi\u00e7bir uluslararas\u0131 sorunun \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclemeyece\u011fi mesaj\u0131n\u0131 vermek ve \u2018hak etti\u011fi\u2019 sayg\u0131nl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 tescil ettirmek.<\/p>\n
Bu hamlelerle Putin\u2019in, Ukrayna krizinden sonra \u00fclkesine d\u00f6n\u00fck olu\u015fan olumsuz tabloyu de\u011fi\u015ftirmeyi ba\u015fard\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 aktaran g\u00f6zlemciler \u00e7o\u011funluktad\u0131r. Bug\u00fcn itibar\u0131yla Rusya, \u015eam\u2019da olas\u0131 herhangi bir rejim de\u011fi\u015fikli\u011fi durumunda bu \u00fclkedeki bilinen siyasi, askeri \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 pe\u015finen garanti alt\u0131na alm\u0131\u015f g\u00f6z\u00fck\u00fcyor[xxiii]. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n, SSCB\u2019den sonra Eski Sovyetler s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131 d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda, ilk askeri hareketini Suriye\u2019ye yapmas\u0131yla, \u2018tek kutuplu\u2019 d\u00fcnyadan \u2018\u00e7ok kutuplu\u2019 d\u00fcnyaya ge\u00e7ildi\u011finin i\u015faretini verdi\u011fi tespitini yapanlar\u0131n yan\u0131l\u0131p yan\u0131lmayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ise tarihin gidi\u015fat\u0131 g\u00f6sterecektir.<\/p>\n
K\u00dcRDLERLE \u0130\u015eB\u0130RL\u0130\u011e\u0130N\u0130N SEBEPLER\u0130<\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n, 30 Eyl\u00fcl 2015\u2019te Suriye\u2019deki \u0130slami ter\u00f6rist gruplara ve Esad muhaliflerine kar\u015f\u0131 hava sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131na ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 d\u00f6nemden itibaren K\u00fcrdlere g\u00f6sterdi\u011fi y\u00fcksek ilgi genel hatlar\u0131yla \u015fu nedenlerden kaynaklanmaktayd\u0131: 1- Rusya, I\u015e\u0130D ter\u00f6r \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fcne kar\u015f\u0131 karada etkili m\u00fccadele veren K\u00fcrdlerin kara deste\u011fine ihtiya\u00e7 duymaktayd\u0131. 2 \u2013 Sovyetler\u2019in \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnden sonra ilk d\u00fcnyasal askeri operasyona kalk\u0131\u015fan Rusya\u2019n\u0131n k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fc\u011f\u00fcnden b\u00fcy\u00fc\u011f\u00fcne m\u00fcttefiklere gereksinimi vard\u0131. 3 \u2013 Rusya, I\u015e\u0130D\u2019le m\u00fccadele s\u00fcrecinde, K\u00fcrd pe\u015fmerge ve gerillalar\u0131n\u0131n direni\u015fine y\u00f6nelik d\u00fcnyada olu\u015fan sempati dalgas\u0131n\u0131n d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda kalamazd\u0131. 4 – Suriye\u2019de, K\u00fcrdlere ABD kadar sempati g\u00f6stermesi, K\u00fcrdlerin ilgisini \u00e7ekmesi gerekirdi. 5 \u2013 K\u00fcrdlere yak\u0131n durarak, onlar\u0131n Esad rejimi ile i\u015fbirli\u011fini g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmek, inzibati federasyon fikrini arka plana itmek de vacipti. 6 \u2013 K\u00fcrdler\u2019in kendi aralar\u0131ndaki par\u00e7al\u0131 durumlar\u0131n\u0131 de\u011ferlendirerek, k\u0131smi lojistik ve askeri yard\u0131mda bulunarak, destek s\u00f6z\u00fc vererek Bat\u0131\u2019ya d\u00f6n\u00fck \u015fartland\u0131rmak. 7 \u2013 Fiilen K\u00fcrdler\u2019in denetimi alt\u0131na giren b\u00f6lgelerde ekonomik ili\u015fkiler geli\u015ftirmek. <\/p>\n
Rusya Siyasi Ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc M\u00fcd\u00fcr\u00fc Sergey Markov\u2019un, “Bence b\u00f6lgedeki K\u00fcrdler ABD’den uzak durmal\u0131”[xxiv] s\u00f6zleri Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Suriye\u2019deki K\u00fcrd siyasetinin iyi bir \u00f6zeti olabilir.<\/p>\n
RUSYA-PYD TEMASLARI. NEREYE KADAR?<\/p>\n
Daha \u00f6nceleri alt d\u00fczeylerde seyreden Rusya-PYD ili\u015fkileri, son iki y\u0131lda y\u00fckselen bir trend izlemeye ba\u015flad\u0131. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n, Cenevre g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerine, K\u00fcrd g\u00fc\u00e7lerinin kat\u0131l\u0131m\u0131 konusunda \u0131srarl\u0131 olmas\u0131, K\u00fcrd-Rus ili\u015fkilerine yeni bir boyut getirdi. Cenevre g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeleri da\u011f\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n inisiyatifiyle yap\u0131lan Moskova toplant\u0131lar\u0131nda PYD\u2019li temsilciler, Ruslarla bir dizi g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi. 2015 Ocak ay\u0131n\u0131n son g\u00fcnlerinde Moskova-Suriye g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerinde Suriyeli muhalif gruplardan kat\u0131lan ki\u015filer aras\u0131nda PYD E\u015fba\u015fkan\u0131 Salih M\u00fcslim de vard\u0131[xxv].<\/p>\n
2015 Nisan ay\u0131n\u0131n ba\u015flar\u0131nda, 06 Haziran 2015\u2019te PYD E\u015fba\u015fkan\u0131 Salih M\u00fcslim ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131nda heyetler, Moskova\u2019da bir dizi g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler yapt\u0131[xxvi]. 08 Ekim 2015\u2019de Paris\u2019te Rusya Devlet Ba\u015fkan\u0131\u2019n\u0131n Yak\u0131ndo\u011fu ve Afrika \u00fclkeleri temsilcisi, Rusya D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan yard\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131 M.Bogdanov ile Salih M\u00fcslim g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015ferek I\u015e\u0130D\u2019e kar\u015f\u0131 i\u015fbirli\u011fi konular\u0131n\u0131 ele ald\u0131lar [xxvii].<\/p>\n
Nihayetinde 10 \u015eubat 2016\u2019da Moskova\u2019da Suriye K\u00fcrdleri temsilcili\u011fi a\u00e7\u0131ld\u0131[xxviii]. Suriye Rojava K\u00fcrdleri temsilcili\u011fi ismi ile a\u00e7\u0131lan dernek, resmiyette h\u00fck\u00fbmet d\u0131\u015f\u0131 toplumsal bir organizasyon olarak kayda ge\u00e7mi\u015fti. Rusya sava\u015f u\u00e7a\u011f\u0131n\u0131n, T\u00fcrkiye taraf\u0131ndan d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fclmesinden k\u0131sa bir s\u00fcre sonra d\u00fcnyada ilk PYD temsilcili\u011finin Moskova\u2019da a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131, \u00e7e\u015fitli \u00e7evrelerde Rusya\u2019n\u0131n T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye bir yan\u0131t\u0131 olarak de\u011ferlendirildi. Elde bulunan veriler de, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Bat\u0131 K\u00fcrdistanl\u0131 direni\u015f\u00e7ilerle askeri i\u015fbirli\u011finin aktif olarak Su-24 tipi Rus sava\u015f u\u00e7a\u011f\u0131n\u0131n, 25 Kas\u0131m 2015 tarihinde T\u00fcrkiye taraf\u0131ndan Suriye s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131 i\u00e7erisinde d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fclmesinden sonra ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 do\u011frular niteliktedir. <\/p>\n
Bat\u0131 K\u00fcrdistan\u2019da Rus sava\u015f u\u00e7aklar\u0131, 2015 Kas\u0131m sonlar\u0131nda do\u011fru Azaz \u00e7evresini, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019den Suriye\u2019deki ter\u00f6r gruplar\u0131na silah ve benzeri m\u00fchimmatlar\u0131n ge\u00e7irildi\u011fi Bab el-Salam g\u00fcmr\u00fck kap\u0131s\u0131n\u0131, \u0130slamc\u0131 ter\u00f6ristlerin mevzilendi\u011fi Deyr Cemal \u00e7evrelerini vurmaya ba\u015flad\u0131. I\u015e\u0130D ve di\u011fer ter\u00f6r gruplar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 d\u00fczenlenen kimi hava sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n, YPG ile koordineli bi\u00e7imde yap\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 hakk\u0131nda Rus ve d\u00fcnya bas\u0131n\u0131na bilgiler d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Az say\u0131da Rus uzman subay\u0131n, sahada YPG ile birlikte \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 da do\u011frulanan bilgiler aras\u0131ndad\u0131r.<\/p>\n
Rusya ile Bat\u0131 K\u00fcrdistan\u2019l\u0131 direni\u015f\u00e7ilerin askeri ili\u015fkilerinin en y\u00fcksek d\u00fczeyde oldu\u011fu d\u00f6nemlerde dahi Rusya, s\u00fcrekli \u2018Suriye\u2019n\u0131n toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fc\u2019 vurgusunu yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ne var ki, 17 Mart 2016\u2019da \u201cRojava ve Kuzey Suriye Demokratik Federal Sistemi\u201d ilan\u0131n\u0131n akabinde \u2018Suriye\u2019nin b\u00f6l\u00fcnmezli\u011fi\u2019nin alt\u0131n\u0131 kal\u0131n hatlarla \u00e7izen Rusya D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri yetkilileri, \u2018\u00d6zerk b\u00f6lgelerin kurulmas\u0131, Suriye halk\u0131n\u0131n verece\u011fi karara ba\u011fl\u0131d\u0131r\u2019 mailinde ifadeler de kullanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu ifadelerden, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Suriye\u2019deki bilinen \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 teminat alt\u0131na al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131 taktirde \u00fclkenin federalle\u015fmesine, \u00f6zerk inzibati yap\u0131lar\u0131n ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131na, kat\u0131 muhalefet etmeyece\u011fi sonucu \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131labilir.<\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n PYD\u2019ye yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131nda \u00fc\u00e7 husus daha \u00e7ok dikkat \u00e7ekmektedir; Bir; I\u015e\u0130D\u2019de kar\u015f\u0131 ortak m\u00fccadele. Ancak I\u015e\u0130D\u2019in Bat\u0131 K\u00fcrdistan\u2019dan t\u00fcmden s\u00f6k\u00fcl\u00fcp at\u0131lmas\u0131, Rusya ile PYD aras\u0131ndaki taktik askeri i\u015fbirli\u011finin de sonlanmas\u0131 anlam\u0131na gelecektir. \u0130ki; PYD\u2019nin Esad rejimi ile iyi ge\u00e7inmesini sa\u011flamak. Esad\u2019la K\u00fcrdler aras\u0131nda olas\u0131 bir ciddi \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma durumunda, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n \u2018arabulucu\u2019 konumundan \u015eam\u2019\u0131 destekler konuma ge\u00e7ece\u011fi ku\u015fku uyand\u0131rmamaktad\u0131r. \u00dc\u00e7; T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye d\u00f6n\u00fck politikada ek bir bask\u0131 unsuru olarak gerekti\u011finde K\u00fcrd fakt\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fc kullanabilmek. U\u00e7ak krizi sebebiyle Ankara-Moskova kavgas\u0131n\u0131n ya\u015fand\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00fcnler ve aylarda, PYD-Rus ili\u015fkileri tavan yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131, her iki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda ili\u015fkiler normalle\u015fmeye ba\u015flad\u0131ktan sonra ise, Ruslar\u0131n \u2018PYD heyecan\u0131\u2019n\u0131n yat\u0131\u015fmaya ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6rmek m\u00fcmk\u00fcnd\u00fcr. <\/p>\n
\u00c7ok yak\u0131n ge\u00e7mi\u015fte, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019yi I\u015e\u0130D ile petrol ticareti yapmakla, ter\u00f6r \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fcn\u00fc besleyip b\u00fcy\u00fctmekle su\u00e7layan, TC Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Erdo\u011fan\u2019a d\u00f6n\u00fck \u2018ter\u00f6rizme yardak\u00e7\u0131l\u0131k yapmak\u2019[xxix] gibi \u00e7ok a\u011f\u0131r ithamlarda bulunan, hatta \u2018Suriye\u2019ye T\u00fcrkiye\u2019den bir sinek dahi ge\u00e7emez\u2019 iddias\u0131nda bulunan Putin, 24 A\u011fustos 2016\u2019da T\u00fcrk silahl\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lerinin a\u011f\u0131r silahlarla, Cerablus\u2019u i\u015fgal etmesine, d\u00fcne kadar i\u015fbirli\u011fi yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 K\u00fcrd direni\u015f\u00e7ilerin s\u00f6z konusu b\u00f6lgeden \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lmas\u0131na g\u00f6z yumdu. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin, Esad\u2019\u0131n d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fclmesi \u0131srar\u0131ndan vazge\u00e7mesinden kaynakl\u0131 olacak b\u00f6ylesi a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 pragmatik davran\u0131\u015f\u0131, Rusya\u2019yla ile ili\u015fkilerde K\u00fcrdlerin istikrar beklememesi gerekti\u011fine de g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir i\u015farettir. <\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n K\u00fcrdlere d\u00f6n\u00fck \u00f6zg\u00fcn bir stratejik yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n bulunmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131, K\u00fcrdler s\u00f6z konusu olunca bir \u00e7ok stratejik ba\u015fl\u0131klarda uzla\u015fmad\u0131\u011f\u0131, kafa kafaya geldi\u011fi ABD\u2019nin K\u00fcrd siyasetini tekrar etmesinden de g\u00f6rebiliyoruz.<\/p>\n
ABD\u2019deki Rusya kar\u015f\u0131tl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 yat\u0131\u015ft\u0131rmak i\u00e7in Rusya \u2018\u00f6nemsiz\u2019 sayd\u0131\u011f\u0131 konularda Washington ile en ufak bir \u00e7eli\u015fki ya\u015famak istememektedir, tam tersine Suriye zeminini, Bat\u0131yla ili\u015fkilerini normalle\u015ftirmek i\u00e7in de\u011ferlendirmektedir. Bu a\u00e7\u0131dan \u2018yan fakt\u00f6r\u2019 olarak g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc K\u00fcrd meselesinde Rusya, Esad rejimini tehlikeye d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcrmedi\u011fi s\u00fcrece, ABD\u2019yi takip edecektir. Jhon Keryy\u2019in \u201cSuriye\u2019de K\u00fcrdlerin ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131y\u0131z\u201d a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131n\u0131 Sergey Lavrov ba\u015fka ifadelerle tekrarl\u0131yor: \u201cK\u00fcrdler Suriye\u2019nin bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olarak kalmal\u0131d\u0131r\u201d [xxx]. Eldeki veriler, Rusya siyasetinin Ortado\u011fu\u2019ya d\u00f6n\u00fck karakterinin analizi, Moskova\u2019n\u0131n hi\u00e7bir zaman K\u00fcrd halk\u0131n\u0131n siyasi stat\u00fcs\u00fc konusunda bir s\u00fcrpriz yapmayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6stermektedir.<\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n genel tutumu, ayn\u0131 zamanda d\u00fcnya ve b\u00f6lgeler siyasetindeki \u00f6nceliklerinin tahlili g\u00f6steriyor ki, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n K\u00fcrdlere d\u00f6n\u00fck ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z bir siyaseti yoktur, olu\u015fmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r, olgunla\u015fmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Asl\u0131nda Rusya\u2019n\u0131n, I\u015e\u0130D ter\u00f6r\u00fcne kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadele ekseninde, K\u00fcrdlerle girdi\u011fi ili\u015fki, ABD ve Bat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n K\u00fcrdlerle y\u00fcr\u00fctt\u00fc\u011f\u00fc ili\u015fkinin bir devam\u0131 niteli\u011findedir. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n gelecekteki yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 da genellikle Bat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n K\u00fcrdlerle y\u00fcr\u00fctt\u00fc\u011f\u00fc i\u015fbirli\u011fi d\u00fczeyinin belirleyece\u011fini tahmin edebiliriz. Son on y\u0131llarda \u00f6zellikle Orta Do\u011fu politikalar\u0131nda Rusya ve ABD\u2019nin ortak mahre\u00e7lerde bulu\u015ftu\u011funun \u00e7ok az g\u00f6r\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc dikkate al\u0131rsak, K\u00fcrd fakt\u00f6r\u00fc, bu iki d\u00fcnya g\u00fcc\u00fc aras\u0131nda birle\u015ftirici rol oynam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Moskova ve Washington\u2019un K\u00fcrdlere askeri destek konusunda sanki bir g\u00f6rev payla\u015f\u0131m\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015flar gibi davranmalar\u0131 dikkat \u00e7ekici olmu\u015ftur. <\/p>\n
ASKER\u0130 VE LOJ\u0130ST\u0130K YARDIM<\/p>\n
I\u015e\u0130D\u2019e kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadele kapsam\u0131nda, \u00e7e\u015fitli devletlerin K\u00fcrdistan B\u00f6lge H\u00fck\u00fcmeti\u2019ne resmi silah yard\u0131m\u0131nda bulunmas\u0131, K\u00fcrdistan\u2019\u0131n devletle\u015fme tarihinde \u00f6nemli a\u015famalardan biri olmu\u015ftur. ABD ve Avrupa devletlerinin ard\u0131ndan Rusya\u2019n\u0131n K\u00fcrd silahl\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lerine askeri destek sunmas\u0131, Rusya-K\u00fcrdistan ili\u015fkilerini yeni bir d\u00fczeye ta\u015f\u0131m\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n
Moskova, Bat\u0131 K\u00fcrdistanl\u0131lar\u2019\u0131n \u0130D ile m\u00fccadelesinde, K\u00fcrdistan B\u00f6lge H\u00fck\u00fcmeti \u00fczerinden ve hava deste\u011fi ile yard\u0131mda bulunmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n
Rusya-PYD ili\u015fkisinin g\u00fc\u00e7lenece\u011fi sinyali, 30 Eyl\u00fcl 2015\u2019te Suriye\u2019deki hava sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131na ba\u015flamadan ilk \u00f6nce Devlet Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Vladimir Putin\u2019in Birle\u015fmi\u015f Milletler Genel Kurulu\u2019ndaki konu\u015fmas\u0131nda, sadece Suriye ordusu ve K\u00fcrdlerin ger\u00e7ek anlamda I\u015e\u0130D\u2019e kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadele etti\u011fi s\u00f6zleri ile verilmi\u015fti.<\/p>\n
16 Mart 2016 tarihinde Erbil\u2019de, K\u00fcrdistan askeri g\u00fc\u00e7lerine 5 adet \u0417\u0423-23-2 \u00e7ift namlulu u\u00e7aksavar[xxxi] ve u\u00e7aksavarlar i\u00e7in 20 bin mermi teslim edilirken[xxxii] Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Erbil konsoloslu\u011fu Ata\u015fesi Artem Grigoryan \u201cBu K\u00fcrdistan\u2019a \u2018d\u00f6rd\u00fcnc\u00fc veya be\u015finci silah sevkiyat\u0131d\u0131r\u201d diye a\u00e7\u0131klama yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r[xxxiii].<\/p>\n
2016 Haziran sonu, G\u00fcney K\u00fcrdistan P\u00ea\u015fmerge g\u00fc\u00e7lerine Musul operasyonuna haz\u0131rl\u0131k amac\u0131yla Kala\u015fnikov makineli tabanca ve makineli t\u00fcfek i\u00e7in 940 bin mermi verilmi\u015ftir. Rus yetkilileri taraf\u0131ndan yap\u0131lan a\u00e7\u0131klamalarda, 70 ton silah ve mermi sevkiyat\u0131ndan bahsedilmi\u015ftir[xxxiv].<\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n verdi\u011fi silahlar\u0131n sembolik bir nitelik ta\u015f\u0131d\u0131\u011f\u0131, K\u00fcrdistan B\u00f6lge H\u00fck\u00fcmeti Rusya temsilcisinin, I\u015e\u0130D ile 1000 kilometrelik bir alanda sava\u015f y\u00fcr\u00fcten K\u00fcrdlerin, be\u015f de\u011fil, y\u00fczlerce u\u00e7aksavara ihtiyac\u0131 vard\u0131r a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131ndan da anla\u015f\u0131lmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n, Bat\u0131 K\u00fcrdistan ve Suriye\u2019de I\u015e\u0130D ter\u00f6r \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fcne kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadele y\u00fcr\u00fcten YPG ve Suriye Demokratik G\u00fc\u00e7leri (SDG) birliklerine havadan destek d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda, herhangi bir silah yard\u0131m\u0131nda bulundu\u011fu konusunda, resmi bir bilgi bulunmamaktad\u0131r. <\/p>\n
Ba\u015fta T\u00fcrkiye bas\u0131n\u0131 olmak \u00fczere, kimi bas\u0131n organlar\u0131nda, Bat\u0131 K\u00fcrdistan\u2019da Rus ordu g\u00fc\u00e7lerinin, YPG\u2019ye 2015 sonbahar\u0131ndan ba\u015flayarak direk silah yard\u0131m\u0131nda bulundu\u011fu hakk\u0131nda s\u0131k s\u0131k haberler d\u00fc\u015fse de bu spek\u00fclatif iddialar, Rusya ve YPG y\u00f6neticileri taraf\u0131ndan teyit edilmemi\u015ftir. <\/p>\n
SONU\u00c7<\/p>\n
K\u00fcrd halk\u0131n\u0131n, onun askeri, siyasi g\u00fc\u00e7lerinin yak\u0131n d\u00fcnya tarihinin en kanl\u0131 ter\u00f6r \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fc \u0130\u015e\u0130D\u2019e kar\u015f\u0131 verdi\u011fi onurlu m\u00fccadele, K\u00fcrdistan B\u00f6lge H\u00fck\u00fcmeti\u2019nin uluslararas\u0131 itibar\u0131n\u0131, g\u00fcvenirli\u011fini artt\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi, Bat\u0131 K\u00fcrdistan\u2019da temel siyasi ve askeri g\u00fc\u00e7 olan PYD\/YPG\u2019nin de d\u00fcnyada me\u015fruiyetini peki\u015ftirmi\u015ftir. Rusya \u00e7a\u011fda\u015f d\u00fcnyan\u0131n bir par\u00e7as\u0131, d\u00fcnya istikrar\u0131 i\u00e7in sorumluluk ta\u015f\u0131yan k\u00fcresel bir g\u00fc\u00e7 olarak K\u00fcrdlerin, insanl\u0131\u011f\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131na bela olmu\u015f bir ter\u00f6rist ak\u0131mdan kurtar\u0131lmas\u0131ndaki rol\u00fcn\u00fc ve \u00f6nemini g\u00f6rmezden gelemezdi. <\/p>\n
Rus-K\u00fcrd ili\u015fkilerinin \u00f6v\u00fcn\u00fcl\u00fcr bir ge\u00e7mi\u015fi, sa\u011fl\u0131kl\u0131 bir arka plan\u0131 bulunmasa da, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n K\u00fcrdlerle I\u015e\u0130D\u2019e kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadele kapsam\u0131nda yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u015fbirli\u011fi, ili\u015fkilerin yeni bir a\u015famaya varmas\u0131 i\u00e7in ciddi bir zemin olarak de\u011ferlendirilebilir. Rusya, gerek \u00c7arl\u0131k zaman\u0131, gerek Sovyetler d\u00f6neminde, gerekse de g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczde K\u00fcrd fakt\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fc, Ortado\u011fu siyasetinde yan bir unsur, K\u00fcrdistan\u2019\u0131 i\u015fgal alt\u0131nda tutan devletlerle ili\u015fkilerinde bir \u2018bask\u0131 malzemesi\u2019 olarak kullanmay\u0131 tercih etmi\u015ftir. <\/p>\n
Bug\u00fcn itibar\u0131yla Rusya, Orta ve Yak\u0131n Do\u011fu\u2019da stat\u00fckolar\u0131n par\u00e7alanmas\u0131n\u0131, gerici rejimlerin bertaraf edilmesini kendi \u2018ulusal g\u00fcvenlik stratejisi\u2019 a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan gerekli g\u00f6rmemektedir. Rusya derin akl\u0131, Irak Devleti\u2019nin fiilen par\u00e7aland\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131, Suriye\u2019nin \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f s\u00fcreci ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019de siyasi depremlerin devam\u0131n\u0131n gelece\u011fini, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n \u015feriat\u00e7\u0131 bir rejimle uzun s\u00fcre y\u00f6netilemeyece\u011fini bilmesine kar\u015f\u0131n, de\u011fi\u015fimin merkezinde bulunmak yerine, geli\u015fmelere \u2018haz\u0131rl\u0131kl\u0131\u2019(italik) olmay\u0131 tercih etmektedir. Bu a\u00e7\u0131dan Ortado\u011fu\u2019nun demokrasi lokomotifi K\u00fcrtlere y\u00f6nelik politikalar\u0131n\u0131 dikkatlice \u015fekillendirmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktad\u0131r. Kremlin\u2019in, b\u00f6lgede \u2018istikrar\u0131n garant\u00f6rleri\u2019 olarak tan\u0131mlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 devletleri savunmaya devam edece\u011fini, K\u00fcrdlere ili\u015fkin politikas\u0131n\u0131, b\u00f6lgesel alt\u00fcst olu\u015flar\u0131 kontroll\u00fc bi\u00e7imde y\u00f6netmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan ABD\u2019 ile uyum i\u00e7erisinde dikkatle ayarlayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 bekleyebiliriz. Bununla birlikte Rusya, t\u00fcm politikalar\u0131nda \u2018tek kutuplu\u2019 d\u00fcnyadan \u2018\u00e7ok kutuplu\u2019 d\u00fcnyaya ge\u00e7ildi\u011fi tezini de dayatmaktan vazge\u00e7meyecektir. <\/p>\n
I\u015e\u0130D\u2019in, Suriye\u2019de ve Orta Do\u011fu\u2019da zay\u0131flamas\u0131, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n ve Bat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n K\u00fcrdlerle ter\u00f6rizme kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadele temelinde olu\u015fmu\u015f i\u015fbirli\u011fini zay\u0131flatacakt\u0131r, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n K\u00fcrdlere yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131 I\u015e\u0130D \u00f6ncesi d\u00fczeye \u00e7ekilecektir. Y\u00f6nl\u00fc g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fler dillendirilse de, \u015fu da unutulmamal\u0131d\u0131r ki, b\u00f6lge yeniden dizayn edilirken, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n da, Bat\u0131\u2019l\u0131 devletlerin de, sek\u00fcler bir g\u00fc\u00e7 olan K\u00fcrdlere ihtiyac\u0131 olacakt\u0131r. Art\u0131k Orta ve Yak\u0131n Do\u011fu\u2019da ciddi bir askeri ve siyasi potansiyele sahip K\u00fcrdler g\u00f6z ard\u0131 edilerek, herhangi bir projenin ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmesinin m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya yetkililerinin, s\u0131k s\u0131k \u2018K\u00fcrdler, Suriye ve Ortado\u011fu\u2019da \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcn bir par\u00e7as\u0131d\u0131r\u2019 a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131 yapmas\u0131, K\u00fcrd potansiyelinin dikkate al\u0131nmas\u0131 olarak de\u011ferlendirilebilir. Bunun yan\u0131nda, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n K\u00fcrdler\u2019in devletle\u015fmesini de\u011fil, yerel \u00f6zerklikleri destekleyen yakla\u015f\u0131m sergiledi\u011fini g\u00f6rebiliyoruz.<\/p>\n
Bu zaviyeden hareketle, K\u00fcrdler a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan hali haz\u0131rda Ortado\u011fu\u2019da, \u00f6zellikle Suriye\u2019de \u00e7\u0131kar m\u00fccadelesi y\u00fcr\u00fcten Rusya\u2019n\u0131n, K\u00fcrdlere ihtiya\u00e7 duymas\u0131na, \u2018ihtiyatl\u0131 bir iyimserlikle\u2019 kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k verilmesi, do\u011fru bir yakla\u015f\u0131m olacakt\u0131r. <\/p>\n
Bu yaz\u0131 \u2018Rusya\u2019n\u0131n I\u015e\u0130D\u2019le m\u00fccadele stratejisinde K\u00fcrdlerin yeri\u2019 ba\u015fl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ile R\u00fbdaw Ara\u015ft\u0131rma Merkezi\u2019nin 19-21 Ekim tarihlerinde Hewl\u00ear\u2019de d\u00fczenledi\u011fi \u2018Musul ve Rakka Operasyonu Sonras\u0131 K\u00fcrdistan\u2019 isimli uluslararas\u0131 Konferans\u2019a sunulmu\u015ftur. <\/p>\n
Tarih: 2016-11-12<\/p>\n[i] \u041f\u0440\u0438\u0441\u043e\u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041a\u0440\u044b\u043c\u0430 \u043a \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438. https:\/\/ru.wikipedia.org<\/p>\n[ii] \u0423\u043a\u0430\u0437 \u041f\u0440\u0435\u0437\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043e\u0442 31 \u0434\u0435\u043a\u0430\u0431\u0440\u044f 2015 \u0433\u043e\u0434\u0430 N 683 “\u041e \u0421\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0438 \u043d\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438”. \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0413\u0430\u0437\u0435\u0442\u0430, 31 \u0434\u0435\u043a\u0430\u0431\u0440\u044c 2015<\/p>\n[iii] \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u043d\u0435 \u043d\u0430\u0434\u043e \u0441\u0442\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0442\u044c\u0441\u044f \u0432\u0441\u0435\u043c \u043f\u043e\u043d\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0442\u044c\u0441\u044f. \u0412\u0441\u0435 \u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e \u043d\u0435 \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u044f\u0442 – \u0421\u0435\u0440\u0433\u0435\u0439 \u041a\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0433\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432. \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044f \u0432 \u0433\u043b\u043e\u0431\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0442\u0438\u043a\u0435. http:\/\/www.globalaffairs.ru\/pubcol\/Rossii-ne-nado-staratsya-vsem-ponravi…<\/p>\n[iv] \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u043d\u0435 \u043d\u0430\u0434\u043e \u0441\u0442\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0442\u044c\u0441\u044f \u0432\u0441\u0435\u043c \u043f\u043e\u043d\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0442\u044c\u0441\u044f. \u0412\u0441\u0435 \u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e \u043d\u0435 \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u044f\u0442 – \u0421\u0435\u0440\u0433\u0435\u0439 \u041a\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0433\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432. \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044f \u0432 \u0433\u043b\u043e\u0431\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0442\u0438\u043a\u0435.<\/p>\n[v] \u041a\u043e\u043d\u0446\u0435\u043f\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0432\u043d\u0435\u0448\u043d\u0435\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0442\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438. \u0421\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0442 \u0411\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438
\n\u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438. http:\/\/www.scrf.gov.ru\/documents\/2\/25.html<\/p>\n[vi] \u0415\u0432\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u044d\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0441\u043e\u044e\u0437. https:\/\/ru.wikipedia.org<\/p>\n[vii] Suriye Krizi ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Uluslararas\u0131 Sistemle Hesapla\u015fmas\u0131. http:\/\/setav.org\/tr\/suriye-krizi-ve-rusyanin-uluslararasi-sistemle-hesap…<\/p>\n[viii] Rusya ile T\u00fcrkiye aras\u0131nda ili\u015fkileri, toprak sorunlar\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fczenleyen Kars antla\u015fmas\u0131 11 Eyl\u00fcl 1922 y\u0131l\u0131nda y\u00fcr\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011fe girdi. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin uluslararas\u0131 konumunu g\u00fc\u00e7lendiren antla\u015fmaya g\u00f6re K\u00fcrdistan topraklar\u0131 olan Kars eyaleti, Ardahan ve Agiri da\u011f\u0131 T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye teslim edilmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n[ix] Ar\u0131kan, P. (2014), \u201c\u0130ran\u2013Rusya mutabakat anla\u015fmas\u0131: stratejik ortakl\u0131k m\u0131?\u201d, Ortado\u011fu Analiz, 6 (64), 56-59.<\/p>\n[x] Ar\u0131kan, P. (2014), \u201c\u0130ran\u2013Rusya mutabakat anla\u015fmas\u0131: stratejik ortakl\u0131k m\u0131?\u201d, Ortado\u011fu Analiz, 6 (64), 58<\/p>\n[xi] Ar\u0131kan, P. (2014), \u201c\u0130ran\u2013Rusya mutabakat anla\u015fmas\u0131: stratejik ortakl\u0131k m\u0131?\u201d, Ortado\u011fu Analiz, 6 (64), 58<\/p>\n[xii] \u041b\u0430\u0432\u0440\u043e\u0432: \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044f \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0449\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u0432 \u0421\u0438\u0440\u0438\u0438 \u043d\u0435 \u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e-\u0442\u043e \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0441\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e, \u0430 \u0433\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e. http:\/\/ria.ru\/syria\/20160517\/1435166880.html<\/p>\n[xiii] \u041b\u0430\u0432\u0440\u043e\u0432: \u043a\u0443\u0440\u0434\u043e\u0432 \u043d\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0437\u044f \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0430 \u0421\u0438\u0440\u0438\u0438. https:\/\/ria.ru\/syria\/20160827\/1475428380.html<\/p>\n[xiv] \u0421\u043a\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043a\u043e \u043c\u0443\u0441\u0443\u043b\u044c\u043c\u0430\u043d \u0436\u0438\u0432\u0435\u0442 \u0432 \u0440\u0430\u0437\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0430\u0445 \u043c\u0438\u0440\u0430? http:\/\/muslem.ru \/\/ \u0418\u0441\u043b\u0430\u043c \u0432 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438. https:\/\/ru.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/\u0418\u0441\u043b\u0430\u043c_\u0432_\u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438
\n[xv] \u042d\u0434\u0443\u0430\u0440\u0434 \u0420\u044b\u0431\u0438\u043d\u0446\u0435\u0432. \u041a\u043e\u043d\u0444\u0435\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0446\u0438\u044f \u211662. http:\/\/skfo.ru\/conference\/item\/62_Eduard_Rybincev\/<\/p>\n[xvi] \u0421\u043f\u0435\u0446\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u044b \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u0432\u044b\u0447\u0438\u0441\u043b\u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0441\u043e\u0442\u043d\u0438 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u043d\u0443\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0445\u0441\u044f \u0438\u0437 \u0421\u0438\u0440\u0438\u0438 \u0438 \u0418\u0440\u0430\u043a\u0430 \u0431\u043e\u0435\u0432\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432 \/\/ \u0420\u0411\u041a, 25.12.2015<\/p>\n[xvii] \u0417\u0430\u043c\u0434\u0438\u0440\u0435\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0430 \u0424\u0421\u0411 \u0440\u0430\u0441\u0441\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0430\u043b \u043e \u0432\u043e\u044e\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0445 \u0437\u0430 \u00ab\u0418\u0441\u043b\u0430\u043c\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0435 \u0433\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e\u00bb \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044f\u043d\u0430\u0445. https:\/\/lenta.ru\/news\/2015\/11\/10\/igil\/<\/p>\n[xviii] \u0412\u044b\u0445\u043e\u0434\u0446\u044b \u0441 \u041a\u0430\u0432\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0430 \u0432 \u0440\u044f\u0434\u0430\u0445 \u0418\u0413 (\u0418\u0413\u0418\u041b). http:\/\/caucasreview.com\/2016\/02\/vyhodtsy-s-kavkaza-v-ryadah-ig-igil\/<\/p>\n[xix] \u041d\u0430 \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0442\u0440\u043e\u043b\u0435 \u0441\u043f\u0435\u0446\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u043d\u0430\u0445\u043e\u0434\u044f\u0442\u0441\u044f 220 \u043f\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u0441\u0435\u0432\u0434\u043e\u0448\u0430\u0445\u0438\u0434\u043e\u0432. http:\/\/tass.ru\/politika\/3489196<\/p>\n[xx] \u0412\u044b\u0445\u043e\u0434\u0446\u044b \u0441 \u041a\u0430\u0432\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0430 \u0432 \u0440\u044f\u0434\u0430\u0445 \u0418\u0413 (\u0418\u0413\u0418\u041b)
\nhttp:\/\/www.kavkaz-uzel.eu\/articles\/251513\/<\/p>\n[xxi] \u041f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041f\u0440\u0435\u0437\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430. http:\/\/www.5-tv.ru\/news\/102578\/<\/p>\n[xxii] Suriye Krizi ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Uluslararas\u0131 Sistemle Hesapla\u015fmas\u0131. http:\/\/setav.org\/tr\/suriye-krizi-ve-rusyanin-uluslararasi-sistemle-hesap…
\n[xxiii] Suriye\u2019de iki oyun kurucu: Rusya ve K\u00fcrtler \u2013 Dr. Mustafa Pek\u00f6z. http:\/\/sendika10.org\/2016\/03\/suriyede-iki-oyun-kurucu-rusya-ve-kurtler-d…<\/p>\n[xxiv] Markov: K\u00fcrdler, Suriye’de ABD’den uzak durmal\u0131. http:\/\/bas-haber.com\/tr\/news\/20144\/markov-kurdler-suriyede-abdden-uzak-d…
\n[xxv] Moskova’da Suriye bar\u0131\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeleri. http:\/\/www.bbc.com\/turkce\/haberler\/2015\/01\/150128_moskova_suriye<\/p>\n[xxvi] \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044f \u043d\u0430\u0447\u0430\u043b\u0430 \u0432\u043e\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0443\u044e \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u043a\u0443 \u0441\u0438\u0440\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043a\u0443\u0440\u0434\u043e\u0432. https:\/\/cont.ws\/post\/155653<\/p>\n[xxvii] \u0417\u0430\u043c \u0433\u043b\u0430\u0432\u044b \u041c\u0418\u0414 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u0432\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0442\u0438\u043b\u0441\u044f \u0441 \u043b\u0438\u0434\u0435\u0440\u043e\u043c \u043a\u0443\u0440\u0434\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0441\u0438\u043b \u0441\u0430\u043c\u043e\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u044b \u0421\u0438\u0440\u0438\u0438. \u041a\u043e\u043c\u0441\u043e\u043c\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0434\u0430. 09.10. 2015. http:\/\/www.kp.ru\/online\/news\/2187398\/<\/p>\n[xxviii] \u0412 \u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u0432\u0435 \u043e\u0442\u043a\u0440\u044b\u043b\u043e\u0441\u044c \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0421\u0438\u0440\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u041a\u0443\u0440\u0434\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0430. http:\/\/www.tvc.ru\/news\/show\/id\/86367)
\n[xxix] \u041f\u0443\u0442\u0438\u043d \u043e\u0431\u0432\u0438\u043d\u0438\u043b \u0422\u0443\u0440\u0446\u0438\u044e \u0432 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0440\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0437\u043c\u0443. http:\/\/www.tvc.ru\/news\/show\/id\/8144<\/p>\n
http:\/\/www.interfax.ru\/world\/525500<\/p>\n[xxxi] \u0417\u0423-23\u22122 \u00e7ift namlulu, 23 mm kalibreli u\u00e7aksavar. Havaya do\u011fru at\u0131\u015f mesafesi 1500 metre. Bir dakikada 2000 mermi s\u0131k\u0131yor. A\u011f\u0131rl\u0131\u011f\u0131 950 kg. 22 mart 1960 y\u0131l\u0131nda kullan\u0131ma sunulmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n[xxxii] \u0418\u0440\u0430\u043a\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u043a\u0443\u0440\u0434\u044b \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u043b\u0438 5 \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0437\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0442\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u043a \u0438 20 \u0442\u044b\u0441. \u0441\u043d\u0430\u0440\u044f\u0434\u043e\u0432. \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0433\u0430\u0437\u0435\u0442\u0430. 16. 03. 2016<\/p>\n[xxxiii] \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044f \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0430 \u0438\u0440\u0430\u043a\u0441\u043a\u0438\u043c \u043a\u0443\u0440\u0434\u0430\u043c \u043e\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0438\u0435 \u0438 \u0431\u043e\u0435\u043f\u0440\u0438\u043f\u0430\u0441\u044b
\n http:\/\/www.vestifinance.ru\/articles\/68663<\/p>\n
http:\/\/www.kurdistan-post.eu\/tr\/analiz\/rusyanin-ortadogu-ve-kurdistan-siyaseti-hejare-samil<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Sa, 23\/01\/2018 – 10:41 Hejar\u00ea \u015eamil H\u0130\u00c7B\u0130R K\u00dcRD, H\u0130\u00c7B\u0130R K\u00dcRD \u00d6RG\u00dcT\u00dc BU AYIN SONUNDA SO\u00c7\u0130’DE RUSYA’NIN \u00d6NC\u00dcLL\u00dc\u011e\u00dcNDE YAPILMASI P\u0130LANLANAN TOPLANTIYA KATILMAMALIDIR. KATILANI TAR\u0130H LANETLER! ** Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nun izin vermesi sonucunda tc devleti 20 Ocak 2018 tarihinde, eski Suriye devletinin Kuzey Suriye Federasyonu\u2019nda bulunan Afrin b\u00f6lgesine i\u015fgal sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131 ba\u015flatt\u0131. Bu sald\u0131r\u0131dan bir g\u00fcn \u00f6nce Putin Rusyas\u0131, …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[54,41],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.dengekurdistan.de\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2278"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.dengekurdistan.de\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.dengekurdistan.de\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.dengekurdistan.de\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.dengekurdistan.de\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=2278"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/www.dengekurdistan.de\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2278\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2279,"href":"http:\/\/www.dengekurdistan.de\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2278\/revisions\/2279"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.dengekurdistan.de\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=2278"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.dengekurdistan.de\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=2278"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.dengekurdistan.de\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=2278"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}